A proposal for a syntactic solution of the problems of disjunction in human thought


The mental logic theory does not accept a rule correct in standard propositional calculus: the disjunction introduction rule (that is, the rule that allows inferring, for example, p or q from p). This is a problem because that very theory admits another schema in which the rule is really involved. It is true that, as shown by López-Astorga, the mental logic theory can be updated following recent empirical results and that such an update can help the theory solve some of its difficulties. However, López-Astorga’s update does not address the challenges directly raised by the disjunction introduction rule, and this paper is intended to do so. In particular, my thesis here is that all of the difficulties of the aforementioned rule can disappear if it is considered to be not a Core Schema of the human syntax of thought, but a Feeder Schema of it.


  • Miguel López Astorga Universidad de Talca, Chile


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Biografía del autor/a

, Universidad de Talca, Chile

Académico del Instituto de Estudios Humanísticos “Juan Ignacio Molina" de la Universidad de Talca (Chile). Director de Universum. Revista de Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales. Doctor en Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia por la Universidad de Cádiz, España (Grado de Doctor reconocido por la Universidad de Chile). Licenciado en Filosofía y Ciencias de la Educación (Sección Filosofía) por la Universidad de Sevilla, España (título revalidado por el de Profesor de Educación Media en Filosofía en la Universidad de Chile). Sus principales áreas de trabajo y de investigación son: lógica, filosofía de la ciencia cognitiva, filosofía de la educación, epistemología, filosofía del lenguaje.

E-mail: milopez@utalca.cl


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