Derrota y defensa en argumentación rebatible

Resumen

Los sistemas argumentativos formalizan razonamiento de sentido común mediante la construcción, comparación y evaluación de argumentos a favor o en contra de ciertas afirmaciones. En tales sistemas existen dos nociones centrales: derrota y defensa. En el presente trabajo caracterizan ambas nociones y se discuten algunos desafíos para las caracterizaciones propuestas. Además, se realizan algunos comentarios al respecto.

Autores/as

  • Claudio Alessio Universidad del Cuyo, Mendoza, Argentina

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Biografía del autor/a


, Universidad del Cuyo, Mendoza, Argentina

Profesor Titular de Lógica y Epistemología de la Universidad Católica de Cuyo. Becario Postdoctoral en el Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur - CONICET.  Doctor en Filosofía por la Universidad Nacional del Sur, Argentina. Sus principales áreas de trabajo y de investigación son lógica filosófica, representación del conocimiento y razonamiento y argumentación rebatible.

E-mail: claudioalessio@uccuyo.edu.ar

Citas

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Publicado
2018-01-26
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