Is endurantism really more plausible than perdurantism from a common-sense perspective?


I will discuss three arguments in favor of perdurantism, the thesis that objects persist by having temporal parts located at different times. Firstly, I will introduce the rival accounts of persistence of perdurantism and endurantism. Then I will discuss three arguments for perdurantism: the problem of temporary intrinsics, the argument from vagueness and the argument from Special Relativity. I will conclude that none of them represents a knock-down argument for perdurantism. However, endurantism faces important difficulties in offering its solutions to the issues at stake, and the solutions proposed are often at odds with commonsense. Therefore, if one of the main problem for perdurantism is its being at odds with commonsense, endurantism is in no better position with respect to this issue.

Palabras clave:

Persistence, Endurantism, Perdurantism, Temporary intrinsics, Vagueness


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Biografía del autor/a

, Universidad de Duisburg-Essen, Essen, Alemania

Estudiante de doctorado en la Universidad de Duisburg-Essen y ex investigador visitante en la Universidad ICESI de Cali. Maestría en filosofía analítica de la Universidad de Barcelona. Maestría en Ciencias Cognitivas y Lenguaje de la Universidad de Barcelona. Sus publicaciones recientes incluyen “What autism can tell us about the relationship between empathy and moral reasoning?” en Phenomenology and Mind y (2016) “The Rule of Accommodation for Presuppositions in Lewis’ Language Game” en Dialogue. Ha presentado recientemente las ponencias “¿Autismo, que puede decirnos acerca de la relación entre la empatía y el razonamiento moral?”  En el VI Congreso colombiano de filosofía (Barranquilla) y “What Autism can tell us about the Relationship between Empathy and Moral Reasoning?” En las conferencias Frontiers in Neuroethics en Padua (Italia) y Emotions, Normativity, and Social Life en Milán (Italia). Sus áreas de interés son la filosofía de la mente y las ciencias cognitivas, la metafísica y la filosofía del lenguaje.



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